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Buildings would seem to be easier to interpret than other art works. 
Architecture stands distinctively exposed to the community. Buildings are 
unavoidable and they enter into many different activities. Larger 
architectural works obtrude into the public context with an intensity and 
physical stubbornness that few art works accomplish. Also, architectural 
works seem more open about themselves than other art works. In planning and 
constructing architecture many people and groups cooperate, and during that 
cooperative process intentions get made explicit; programs get written; 
functions get defined and evaluated. Compared to the other arts, there is 
more available evidence about the intentions and program behind the works 
and the choices made in their design. Interpretation and criticism of these 
intentions and choices seems more possible. Public reaction can range from 
public debate about the functional appropriateness of a new town hall, to 
learned professional critical discussion of the success of a new building 
in fulfilling its program, to people saying after a party that they would 
never live in That house.
Yet for all this exposure, architecture maintains a distinctive resistance 
to interpretation. Although statements of intention and program exist, they 
are themselves texts that need interpretation. Perhaps the parties 
understood the terms differently, perhaps the language has changed, perhaps 
there were unspoken private intentions, perhaps there were unwritten 
agreements. No text is self-interpreting. Also, though architectural works 
intrude into the public context, a context itself is not fully definite; it 
too needs interpretation. A building can change a context as well as fit 
into it, and the new whole can be reinterpreted in unexpected ways.
Then there are the many dimensions that enter into interpretation and 
criticism: function, appearance, immediate reactions, community standards, 
previous experiences, notions of function, rules of design, bodily 
experience, philosophies of art, and so on. It is not automatically clear 
whether and how these are to be prioritized, nor what aspects of the 
context are relevant, nor what previous works should be taken as 
precedents, since there are many possible relations of similarity. 
Finally, although buildings have more flanks exposed to criticism, they 
often outlive their critics and the climate of opinion that judged them. 
Functions and modes of life change. Judgments and meanings that once seemed 
firm lose their hold as time goes on. Grand old buildings once publicly 
approved become an embarrassment and no suitable use can be found for them. 
"That house" becomes something to be preserved for its unique quirks. The 
once inappropriate town hall becomes a symbol of our city. The work that 
violated the rules of a style becomes emblematic of a new style.
In response to such considerations, it is easy to suggest that 
interpretation should be more flexible, responsive, and the like, and to 
worry how that flexibility might lead to arbitrariness. But there is a 
deeper issue with the way the problem of interpretation often gets posed. 
It treats buildings according to a scheme of passive text and active 
interpreters, where the building is a particular thing, describable by such 
and such measurements and materials, waiting to be read by the interpreter/
critic and assigned its meaning and value. 
But a building does not sit quietly, or rather, its sitting quietly is not 
the whole of its being-there. Abstracted from ongoing community talk and 
use the building becomes a pile of stuff with no clear boundaries. 
Insertion into forms of life makes the building meaningful. But the 
relation of the pile to the building is not the relation of a totally 
definite particular thing to a more fully categorized thing. A building, as 
well as its built and social context, is not a totally definite particular 
thing or assembly of things passively waiting to receive a general 
categorization by active subjects or communities who are themselves already 
totally definite. The interpreter, the community, the building, its norms, 
and the contexts are all involved together, but not as pre-defined items. 
In this mutual involvement, buildings act too; they can change their users, 
often beyond the intentions and choices in their original design. The work 
is always in progress. We are always on the way to finding definite meaning 
anew together. 
It would seem, though, that emphasizing this larger context and process 
does little to help with the problems about interpreting architecture. 
Indeed it seems to push further in the direction of a facile relativism. 
This is because today the assemblages within which interpretation occurs, 
what Hegel might call "shapes of spirit," are multiple and intersecting, 
not the large epochal unities that Hegel analyzed and academic culture 
likes to periodize. We live in many places at once that are not concentric. 
They intersect at angles and lie together at foldings and are open and 
closed to one another in complex ways without exclusive or concentric 
borders. Our inhabitation is multiple, and that multiplicity is not just an 
additive series of smaller seamless inhabitations. Even single places are 
fractured. Places, persons, and communities do not now and may never have 
had such simple identities as our concepts made them out to have. But our 
places and identities become complexly multiplied, interpenetrating, and 
the electronic no-place-all-place opens before us.  
But this multiplicity does not imply that buildings can be interpreted 
arbitrarily. That would presume the same detached interpreter and passive 
isolated building. 
In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (III-26, 49, V-51), 
Wittgenstein writes about the way we interpret diagrams of mechanisms. We 
can just see that if the lever is moved, the wheel will turn 
counterclockwise. The machine is clear and we have a habit of reading. But 
in real life perhaps the lever will break,  perhaps the  wheel is stuck, 
perhaps there is a piece of the machine that we can't see because it is 
under the wheel in the diagram. We can read the diagram because we abstract 
the machine from a real context. Something similar can happen with 
architectural plans, models, and even photographs, especially photographs 
that ignore context. The unbuilt or isolated building or plan seems clear, 
easy to understand, obvious in its function. It represents itself as 
fitting perfectly into its projected uses. But in real life the building is 
exposed to unexpected pressures and to changes that are less than ideal and 
far from clear, while the building itself exerts pressures upon its users 
to change their expectations and habits.
That is, in the assemblage that includes interpreter and building, there 
are constraints that stem precisely from the way buildings and interpreters 
are out in public. These constraints do not mandate one particular 
interpretation but they do restrict possible interpretations by increasing 
the salience of some criteria and horizons of meaning over others.
Architects have always had to work at the intersections of meaning and 
causality.  Buildings are more tied to natural and causal connections than 
are most works of art. Multiple sub-communities in an area may have 
differing practices and values, but when people share a geographical area, 
they share its infrastructure: roads and highways, water, power grids, 
waste systems, product distribution networks, and so on. Even while living 
by varying social norms in different spatial patterns they act together as 
drivers, passengers, shoppers, efficient users of resources. As a result, 
the meaning of a building can be affected by new causal patterns in the 
infrastructure shared by all the sub-communities in a given area. 
Consider bicycle sheds. In general, not all buildings are equally prominent 
or meaningful in a given cultural context and set of practices. (See, for 
example, Karsten Harries' discussion of Ruskin in chapter 3 of Harries 
1997.) Strictly speaking it is true that one could trace the whole context 
starting out from the practices around the most humble building or tool, 
but some buildings are lived as more prominent and central than others. In 
a traditional town, a bicycle shed is not so important as a large civic 
building. The shed could be demolished or replaced without many ripple 
effects, but a cathedral or a courthouse has a more central place in the 
culture and context. 
Yet on the other hand, it is not purely a matter of architectural 
prominence or detail that determines which buildings assume influential 
roles in an assemblage of customs, cultural values and practices. In a more 
secular world the cathedral becomes less central to actual practice. Also, 
causal effects impinge on all shapes of spirit. At a time of peak oil and 
rising concern with global warming, a bicycle shed might indeed become a 
more central symbol and more prominent meeting place than a cathedral or a 
civic building. Changes in the causal availability of natural resources 
would have increased the salience of environmental values and meanings, 
changing shared practices so that the built landscape would center itself 
in new ways and demanding that interpretations not ignore this dimension of 
the context. There are always public exposures and causal constraints. 
Interpretations of architecture happen at these intersections, and  
interpretations need to be responsive within dimensions of meaning that are 
not under the control of either the architect or the interpreter.
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